### **Part One is the Framework**

**We’re operating in a harmonious aesthetic platform and our very speech act is a part of aesthetics and we must move towards understanding how this relates to all of our bodies. This establishes a meta-constraint on other frameworks; you can’t begin to evaluate human interactions without understanding aesthetics,** Gilmore. (Paul Gilmore, Associate Professor of English at California State University, Long Beach – scholar critical work in dealing with the history, transatlantic dimensions, and political promises of American Romantic literature - Aesthetic Materialism: Electricity and American Romanticism, Published 01/01/2009) \*\*\* edited for gendered language

**It is through the aesthetic**, through taste, **that humanity can achieve** this completion, **this wholeness of being, not just on the level of the individual but on the national or social level**—“Taste alone brings harmony into society, because **it fosters harmony in the individual.** All **other forms of perception divide** ~~man~~ [people], **because they are founded exclusively either upon the sensuous or upon the spiritual part** of ~~his~~ [their] **being only the aesthetic mode of communication unites society, because it relates to that which is common to all**” (215). **Aesthetics becomes** the **essential** sphere **for reconciling the individual with society**, so that “if ~~man~~ [humanity] is ever to solve that 34 Idealist Aesthetics and the Republican Telegraph problem of politics in practice ~~he~~ [humanity] will have to approach it through the problem of the aesthetic, because it is only through Beauty that ~~man~~ [humanity] makes ~~his~~ [its] way to Freedom” (9). By envisioning the individual human as potentially achieving complete self-integrity, as achieving an internal wholeness and completion, and by espousing a “pure concept of human nature” grounded in the “absolute and unchanging” (71), Schiller is able to imagine a political state free of unresolvable conflict. Freedom is possible, then, because of the “absolute, unchanging, unity of [the individual’s] being” (57): “Wholeness of character must therefore be present in any people capable, and worthy, of exchanging a State of compulsion for a State of freedom” (23). For this line of thought, which runs on the left through Marx’s idea of species-being, to Ernst Bloch’s utopian function of art, to Herbert Marcuse’s aesthetic dimension, the political force of aesthetics lies in its radical vision of a non-alienated humanity.35 Schiller’s aesthetics became an essential template for nearly all utopianist, leftist **aesthetics** because it **imagined the aesthetic realm as laying the groundwork for the production of free individuals able to work and live in complete harmony with one another**.36 Despite maintaining his commitment to a more liberal politics, Schiller’s aesthetic politics parallels Coleridge’s as attempts to delimit the imagination as the basis for politics in reaction to the French Revolution.

#### **Impacts:**

1. **My f/w must come first because other framework bites into one of two problems either they focus on the physical senses of a subject (i.e. pain/ pleasure, material aspects) OR they focus on the the “spiritual” defined as (virtues, feelings of inherent morality/immorality); those approaches inherently divide and are a reasone why our methodology is uniquely good.**

#### **Critical analysis and understanding of how the sublime comes to be vis-à-vis aesthetics is essential to intersubjectivity and subject formation– understanding perceptions of the “aesthetic experience” must occur before we can accurately assess the normative questions of the resolution. The K is a pre requisite to all your theory impacts…put away those shells, Gilmore** **2** (Paul Gilmore, Associate Professor of English at California State University, Long Beach – scholar critical work in dealing with the history, transatlantic dimensions, and political promises of American Romantic literature - Aesthetic Materialism: Electricity and American Romanticism, Published 01/01/2009)

Because **aesthetic experience occupies the space between individual experience and social reality**, the space created by the intersection of the various materialities evoked by electricity, it is both subjective and universal. The subjective nature of this universality provides both the utopian impulse Introduction 11 in aesthetic politics and aesthetic ideology’s coercive power. Aesthetic Materialism attempts to navigate between these poles by maintaining its focus on this very experience of subjective universality. In **the aesthetic experience**, the self seems to recede, **as individuals give themselves over to the object** (or, more properly, the perception of the object), and thus are left feeling as though anyone would have the same reaction. In that moment**, it is inconceivable that anyone would not recognize the beauty, the sublimity, the humor, the ugliness** of the thing perceived. The perceiving subject, in other words, recognizes no basis for this judgment in his or her particular interests, investments, desires. As such, **this experience seems to place the individual outside civil society**, the modern arena “of uncoerced human association **and** also the set **of relational networks**—formed for the sake of family, faith, interest, and ideology—that fill this space.”21 While an aesthetic experience might occur only because of one’s place within society— one’s social background, age, education, location, or privilege in relation to particular institutions—it does not directly or immediately involve the self in the negotiations, struggles, and identifications attendant in the working of civil society. Individuals may feel moved by a Picasso painting or Eliot’s “The Waste Land” only as a result of the training and education they have received due to their class position, their own individual histories crisscrossed by relations of power involving gender, nationality, and sexuality. Others may be touched by a renaissance Pietà or be moved by the beauty of a Thomas Kinkade painting due to a similar confluence of different overdetermined reasons. Yet that does not mean that the individual’s aesthetic experience of those objects necessarily feeds back into or undermines the social structures and ideologies giving rise to those particular encounters. In its intense focus on the sensuous perception of the object itself, the aesthetic momentarily interrupts both the dominant sense of the self as interested and autonomous and an instrumentalized orientation towards the world. In this way, **aesthetics leads to “putting into question the individual’s** ‘ordinary’ **relation to all spheres of existence,** and of reconstituting them as sites of aesthetic incompletion,” “the ceaseless problematization of and withdrawal from all normative judgment itself.”22 The most compelling attempts at revitalizing aesthetics have understood aesthetics in these terms, but have tended to move, too quickly, it seems to me, towards reading aesthetics as constituting a progressive politics focused on indeterminacy.23 Even in its recognition of the contingency of experience and identity, of the a mbivalence of representation, the aesthetic experience’s political effects—or even its tendencies—remain indeterminate. That is not to say that aesthetic experience remains permanently outside 12 Introduction the political. Instead, as “subjective universality” indicates, aesthetic experience always posits a reference to other people. **In the aesthetic moment, the individual feels at one with some universal humanity who must have the same reaction. Yet the subjective nature of the event reiterates the observer’s detachment both from the object** as a result of language’s mediation, the nervous system, and individual experience—and from any imagined universal community. These elements come together in the almost involuntary need to share this response—“Isn’t that beautiful? Isn’t that horrifying?” The question is simultaneously rhetorical—of course it’s beautiful—and is in need of confirmation because the experience’s universality is already in doubt. **If the first moment** of **the aesthetic experience seems**, in its apparent disinterestedness, **to lie** completely **outside of both society and politics**, the immediacy of **the second moment indicates that such an experience** inexorably moves towards the recognition of a larger community and the recognition that others might not share the reaction. It is through these second-level reflections or responses that aesthetics **leads to the political.**24 While this experience can possibly lead to a celebration of difference, a skepticism towards any universalizing or normalizing claims, it is equally or more likely that it will feed into a reactionary response wherein the experience is taken to define what is truly human or what links a particular group together. To cordon off aesthetic experiences that lead to specific, exclusionary identifications—nationalistic, racist, class-bound—or that lead to an easy sort of universal humanism is to return, in different form, to a norm for judging such experience. Not to recognize those uses of or responses to aesthetic experience as possible, if not predominant, is to engage in a naïve celebration of aesthetics forgetful of the work of the past decades that has outlined the ways aesthetic experience is frequently made to be complicit with narrowly defined interests. It is essential, then, to bracket this first moment of sociopolitical indeterminacy in examining aesthetic experience. In reconsidering contemporary ideas and claims about aesthetics, this book focuses on writers who attempted to hold onto the first ambiguous moment of aesthetic experience, to hold in abeyance both the move towards the political and the subsequent defining and delimiting of the ineffability of the experience.

#### Impacts:

1. **Epistemology first – it frames our very being absent an understanding of it there is no way to evaluate how consequences affects x actor, nor how said actor engages with political spaces.**

#### Thus the role of the ballot is to endorse the debater with the best methodology to creating a space capable of subject formation and exposing/understanding the power structures that prevent such a space from existing in the status quo.

### Part Two is the Substance

#### If aesthetics is left unanalyzed the impact is a form of *aestheticized cannibalism* which is characterized by the pleasurable consumption of demonized flesh – by determining what is pure and impure, civilized and primitive, beautiful and repulsive – we find ourselves sensationalizing despotism with a desire for catharsis in the form of social purification - further sustaining the fantasy of the sublime, **Copjec.** (Joan Copjec – professor of comparative literature, and conceptions of modern media, and literary aspects of the English language - also director of the Center for the Study of Psychoanalysis and Culture at the University of Buffalo. Her research concerns the status of sexual difference as a primary (or ontological) rather than a secondary (or ontic) category – she writes on aestheticized social consumption and how psychoanalysis and Freudian theories fail to resolve it; (Umbr(a): Aeshetics & Sublimation (1999) ; UMBR(a): A Journal Of The Unconscious)

Though the concept of **sublimation**-Freud’s indispensable contribution **to aesthetic theory**-constantly teeters on the verge of collapse into the related concepts of idealization, inhibition, and reaction formation, Lacan manages to pluck some uncharred core from the fires of confusion by **focusing precisely on** this question of **purification** as it crops upvariously **in both the aesthetic and psychoanalytic notions of catharsis** and in the very terms sublime and sublimation. far from being an emission, the body, as Lacan helps us to see, is a precipitate of that process of purification which ~ aesthetic experience highlights. that aesthetic experience would be thought to include the body is from the historical perspective no surprise, since **the discourse of aesthetics arose** in the eighteenth century initially **as a discourse on the body** and the part it plays in securing the bonds of community. the point at which the body drops out is the point at which **sensational life comes to be divided into pure and impure forms and this division is assumed to mark a distinction between civilized and primitive** sensations. the body, aligned with the primitive sensations, is purged from the "higher" ones. referring to the "rabble of the senses" and to a "taste of the tongue, palate, and the throat" distinct from the taste manifest in aesthetic judgment, Kant did nothing to discourage this error- to which Freud would also fall prey in civilization and its discontents-of conceiving of an uncivilized, that is to say, simple and primitive form of pleasure. there is among humans no such thing, as there is no degree of civilization, nor primitive pocket of our being. and freud knew this, every bit as much as Marx, who came close to Freud when he said, hunger is hunger, but the hunger gratified by cooked meat eaten with a knife and fork is a different hunger from that which bolts down raw meat with the aid of hand, nail and tooth. **production thus produces not only the object but also the manner of consumption**, not only objectively but **subjectively**.4 because the taste of the tongue is no less civilized than that of aesthetic judgment, the division between pure and impure pleasure must come down to something other than the rationally "cooked" versus the simply "raw," for the status of the raw is mythical. we can put this differently: it is only trivially true that we refrain ordinarily from eating aesthetic objects; the distinction which is crucial to aesthetic theory is not between the aesthetic object and food (or sex), but between the aesthetic object and "goods," that is: commodities. this is the position of Marxism, the one discourse that has consistently retained the category of the aesthetic as a priority of its agenda. in his intervention in aesthetic theory in the seminar the · ethics of psychoanalysis, Lacan crisscrosses familiar Marx 1st territory, taking note of the generalized bracketing of use value in favor of exchange value by capitalism **and the consequent rise of utilitarianism as its enabling ideology, since util**itarianism **seeks to reconcile** exchange value and **consumer desire by reinstalling** a concept of use as a translation, however false, of **market value.** under these terms, the distinction between **pure and impure** pleasures **begins to be redefined as a division between useless** (that is, purified of purpose) **and useful** (or dutiful) enjoyment. the whole ambivalence of Marxism in general toward aesthetic objects will turn on whether this division is allowed to stand as is-in which case the value of the aesthetic is said to lie in its resistance to market forces-or is redescribed as a softer distinction between deferred and direct pleasure/use-in which case the aesthetic comes to be seen as a means by which capitalism sinks its teeth more deeply into the consumer, bating him or her with promises of an ideal world in which production and desire will adequate each other. Lacan alters this Marxist, problematic by dropping into its midst a notion of psychoanalysis's invention which once again allows us to rethink the relevant distinction. the notion is that of the superego and the reign of capitalism is viewed by Lacan as coextensive with the reign of the superego. why? the idea of a deferred pleasure on which capitalism vitally depends, in turn, not, as the ideology of utilitarianism insists, on the possibility of a just distribution of goods, so much as on a deprivation of them: one good must be withdrawn from circulation in order to establish the law of the general equivalence of all the rest. the radical withdrawal or, in psychoanalytic terms, repression of one thus inaccessible, untouchable good causes all the others to dissolve into the indifference that is the necessary condition of their commensurability. through the gap that is created between the goods in the marketplace and the one that has been set aside for the exclusive enjoyment of the other-that is to say, the superego-the capitalist future opens; it is in its very substance nothing other

#### We outweigh on impact calc. the aforementioned division of bodies into pure and impure, useful and useless is an explicit form of dehumanization which is the worst impact…you guessed it Bereube David Berube, Ph.D. in Communications and Professor of Communication at South Carolina, “Nanotechnological Prolongevity: The Down Side”, NanoTechnology Magazine, June/July 1997, p. 1-6, URL: http://www.cla.sc.edu/ENGL/faculty/berube/prolong.htm) This means-ends dispute is at the core of Montagu and Matson's treatise on the dehumanization of humanity. They warn: "its destructive toll is already greater than that of any war, plague, famine, or natural calamity on record -- and its potential danger to the quality of life and the fabric of civilized society is beyond calculation. For that reason this sickness of the soul might well be called the Fifth Horseman of the Apocalypse.... Behind the genocide of the holocaust lay a dehumanized thought; beneath the menticide of deviants and dissidents... in the cuckoo's nest of America, lies a dehumanized image of man... (Montagu & Matson, 1983, p. xi-xii). While it may never be possible to quantify the impact dehumanizing ethics may have had on humanity, it is safe to conclude the foundations of humanness offer great opportunities which would be foregone. When we calculate the actual losses and the virtual benefits, we approach a nearly inestimable value greater than any tools which we can currently use to measure it. Dehumanization is nuclear war, environmental apocalypse, and international genocide. When people become things, they become dispensable. When people are dispensable, any and every atrocity can be justified. Once justified, they seem to be inevitable for every epoch has evil and dehumanization is evil's most powerful weapon.

#### We advocate for the thought experiment of public colleges and universities in the US not restricting any constitutionally protected speech as a mechanism to embrace the material opacity of language and the radical indeterminacy of meaning. All speech codes give political power to language and prevent us from having true intersubjectivity. The advocacy is a pre-req to any political action it’s a question of our epistemology, **Gilmore** **3.** (Paul Gilmore, Associate Professor of English at California State University, Long Beach – scholar critical work in dealing with the history, transatlantic dimensions, and political promises of American Romantic literature - Aesthetic Materialism: Electricity and American Romanticism, Published 01/01/2009)

From this reading, Shelley’s idea of the poet as an unacknowledged legislator wielding a sword of lightning takes on a new light, revealing the limitations as well as the power of poetry as a political force. Eschewing the utopianism of the late Enlightenment, Shelley electrifies the human imagination, rendering it both the medium where the mental and the physical meet and the source of intellectual and physical freedom. As such, the materiality of electric poetry lies not just in its physicality—in language being registered by the senses—but in its genesis within and action upon the social world. Poetry is material because it is literally **words**, which **are material themselves, but it is also** material in a sociohistorical sense, **the product of material** **conditions of political and economic structures**. In “Defence,” for example, Shelley indicates that it is poetry’s embeddeness in what we might now call social discourse that gives it its “electric life,” as that life is “less [the poets’] spirit than the spirit of the age” (7:140). Similarly, in the preface to Prometheus Unbound, in further developing the figure of lightning thought, Percy elaorates this relationship between mind and the world, gesturing to its political implications: “The great writers of our own age are, we have reason to suppose, the companions and forerunners of some unimagined change in our social condition, or the opinions which cement it. The cloud of mind is discharging its collected lightning, and the equilibrium between institutions and opinions is now restoring, or is about to be restored” (2:173). Echoing Schlegel’s prediction about the lightning charge of poetry, Percy at once envisions political revolution and at the same time insists that the changes to come are unpredictable, are “unimagined.” Thus, in concluding his preface to Prometheus Unbound, Percy acknowledges his “‘passion for reforming the world,’” but insists that his poetry does not contain “a reasoned system on the theory of human life. Didactic poetry is my abhorrence” (2:174). As Kaufman, from an Adornian-Marxist position, Paul Hamilton, from a Habermasian-Public Sphere approach, and Redfield, from a de Manian–deconstructive angle, have all differently argued, it is **this refusal of political commitment** that **allows** Shelley to provide **an alternative understanding of aesthetic** politics.27 **Through acknowledging the material opacity of language itself and by gesturing to the radical indeterminacy of meaning**, in drawing on materialist **understandings of** the mind and the basis of **the self** in the senses, **and in recognizing** the **sociohistorical conditions** and material means by which poetry is disseminated, Percy Shelley emerges as a theorist and practitioner of **a kind of aesthetics imagined to engender critical thinking about one’s self and the world, a process of constantly questioning received ideas that opens the self to new experiences** and new perspectives **that** might **provide the ground for sociopolitical change** but that refuses to offer a political programme.

#### Impacts:

1. **Only only by embracing the material opacity of language (stripping language of all its power) can we truly open up the space to do so. PCU’s implement speech codes to protect students from “harmful” language, but this is wat confers power and meaning to it in the first place; we must embrace free speech as a methodology to negate its meaning…it’s the only way to create change that’s Gilmore 3.**

#### The logic of restricted discourse assumes a pure space of communication; but this perpetuates the very aestheticized cannibalism the affirmative critiques, Davis. [Davis, Diane. “‘Addicted to Love’; Or, Toward an Inessential Solidarity.” Vol. 19 No. 4. 1999.]

Our fix of finitude, however, reminds us that this so-called home is haunted. In fact, etymologically speaking, "what haunts is also a haunt something that doubles. . .for a familiar place. Haunting belongs to the family of Heim" (Ronell, Dictations xviii). Heim, then, is never not unheimlich; a home is never not haunted. What goes for the subject's home-base, ethos, is spooked, relentlessly, by itsown fractal interiorities, its own unditchable and unsharable alterity?its finitude, which is precisely what it shares with others.15 There never was any "internal peace" in "self-identification," as Lyotard has warned, that was not purchased at the price of what itmust exorcise: "The Volk shuts itself up in theHeim, and it identifies itself through the narratives attached to names" (Differend 151)?that is, through the identification associated with Geschlecht? exorcising its spooks so as to preserve its illusion of stasis, of sobriety. **When "communication" signifies only "reasonable exchange"** among subjects, you can bet that **alterity** already **will have been barred** from the conversation. This is why Nancy charges that "the conventional chatter that attempts to promote **reasonable exchange" as synonymous with communication "serves** only **to obscure violence**, betrayal, and lies" ("Exscription" 319)? serves, that is, only to cover over the finitude itought to be exposing. It may be that any theory of communication that places a speaking subject in charge of building community effaces the sharing it attempts to promote. The "subject representing," after all, is not the same as the "being-communicating" (Nancy, Inoperative 24). Communication. . .happens? it is beyond our control; it is, in fact, who we are: **communication is "the predicament of being"** for any ekstatic existent (24). In as much as this existent functions as "threshold," it is continuously exposed to an in-common outside and so is always already communicating finite being to finite being by virtue of that exposure, by virtue of an involuntary. . .touch. There is no escaping community or this irrepressible communication, which neither expresses a bond[age] nor approximates a Vulcan mind-meld but simply operates as an exposition of the finitude.. .that.. .we.. .share? an exposition, as George Bataille has put it, that "tears [us] together" (22). A subject's representations can aim to crank up this rustle of finitude or to tune it out, but communication will have been happening, either way. Maybe this needs to be made explicit: this originary "communication," this sharing, does not signify "under/standing." That is, what "communication" gives us to understand, Nancy explains, is only "that there is no common understanding of [or in] community, that **sharing does not constitute** an **understanding** (or a concept, or an intuition, or a schema), that it does not constitute a knowledge, and that it gives no one, including community itself, mastery over being-in-common" ("Myth Interrupted" 69). Communication is no more or less than the exposition of the overflowing, inappropriable, un-sharable finitude that we share. And neither speaking nor writing is a means of this communication; rather, each is "communication itself, an exposure" (Nancy, Inoperative 31). Communication as understanding, Nancy observes, "is always disappointing," it's always "the communication of a disappointment, a non-possibility, a withdrawal of communication" ("Speaking" 314-15). One can never be sure that a communique will arrive at its destination, and one can be fairly certain that if it does, it won't arrive as what it was when it was sent. And yet, in all the missed connections, in all the another communication is exposed: a communication [that] communicates the withdrawal or understanding and/but also the opening of another kind of sharing (315).16 This is not to say that what gets said is insignificant. But it is to say that a certain irrepressible communication is not about exchanging information, arguing a point, or expressing a bond: it's only about exposing understanding's withdrawal and so exposing finitude. . .as what we share. **The ethical** question par excellence for the third sophistic rhetorician **is not how to move** an audience **toward a predetermined** action or attitude but rather how to crank up the "noise," the excess, the interference that must be silenced for the sake of "reasonable erits," for the sake of cutting unifying figures. The question, in other words, that finitude prompts is not how to use language to build community; it is**, rather, how to amplify** the **communications** of community that are **drowned out by the processes of identification.**

#### Impacts:

#### That affirms under our methodology embracing the material opacity of language rejects the aestheticized misconception of communication that free speech regulations try to promote. Rather, we should embrace communication outside of language. Takes out your generic hate speech PIC the logic that justifies regulating free speech is circular and causes alterity to be excluded by attempting to determine what is “pure” communication.

### Part Three is the Underview

#### First, Reasonability over Competing Interps:

#### Second, use a comparative worlds paradigm:

Third, Debate is Excluding certain bodies and fairness is part of that problem

#### Fourth, Give aff RVI’s on T and Theory

#### AND the K will come before theory because…